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Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen: Arbitration
and Punitive Damages
In recent years arbitration has gained popularity as a method of dispute
resolution.1 Arbitration obviates the expense and delay of litigation. 2 Moreover, in a commercial context, arbitration provides a forum in which parties can
resolve disputes according to business judgment and experience rather than rules
of law.3 As with most other states and the federal government, North Carolina
has encouraged the use of arbitration by enacting legislation that provides a statutory framework for the process. 4 Early commentators believed that arbitration
should serve only to resolve ordinary business disputes that involve questions of
fact and simple questions of law.5 Modem statutes, however, permit parties to
submit virtually any existing dispute to arbitration and to authorize binding
agreements to arbitrate all future claims arising out of contracts. 6 In addition,
modem statutes typically provide that arbitrators may fashion remedies without
7
regard to legal standards.
1. See Wilner, Preface to M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATiON at v (rev. ed.
1984).
2. See Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 269 (1926).
3. Id.
4. In 1973 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act. Act
of May 22, 1973, ch. 676, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20
(1983)). There are six "essential aspects" of a "modem" arbitration statute:
1. irrevocability of any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration;
2. power of a party, pursuant to a court directive, to compel a recalcitrant party to proceed
to arbitration;
3. provisions that any court action instituted in violation of an arbitration agreement may
be stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken place;
4. authority of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies when the parties do not
make the designation, or when arbitrators withdraw or become unable to serve during
arbitration;
5. restrictions on the court's freedom to review the findings of facts by the arbitrator and
his application of the law;
6. specification of the grounds on which awards may be attacked for procedural defects,
and of time limits for such challenges.
M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 4:01, at 27. The Uniform Arbitration Act contains all six of these
attributes. UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) (irrevocability "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."); id. § 2(a), at 23 (staying of court
actions instituted in violation of an agreement to arbitrate); id. § 4, at 35 (appointment of arbitrators
by court); id. § 12, at 55 (scope of review); id. § 13, at 68 (modification of awards). Twenty-six states
have adopted the Uniform Act, M. DOMKE, supra note I, § 4:02, at 30, and forty states have enacted
"modem" arbitration statutes. Id. § 4:01, at 28 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1985). The Federal Arbitration Act is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
5. E.g., Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 281.
6. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (1983):
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy
existing between them ... or they may include in a written contract a provision for the
settlement by arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between them relating to
such contract.... Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable
except with the consent of all the parties, without regard to the justiciable character of the
controversy.
But see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (using nearly identical language, but limited to commercial disputes).
7. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13(a)(5) (1983) ('IThe fact that the relief was such that it

1146

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Despite the broad scope of modem arbitration statutes, many courts have
held that certain issues may not be submitted to arbitration because public policy requires resolution in a judicial forum.8 Also, even when the underlying
issue is arbitrable, courts have vacated arbitration awards on public policy
grounds. 9 In each of these two instances, the courts vitiate or diminish the ad-

vantages of arbitration.10 Thus, when the arbitrability of an issue or an arbitration award is challenged on public policy grounds, the courts, with some
difficulty, must weigh the specific public policy asserted in the challenge against
the general policy favoring arbitration.'1
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen 12 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that punitive damages may be awarded in arbitration. 13 Although

North Carolina courts had previously not addressed the issue whether claims for
punitive damages are arbitrable, other jurisdictions have decided the question
and have reached conflicting results. Some courts have held that public policy
prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, 14 while other courts have

ruled otherwise because a strong state policy favors arbitration. 15 The Rodgers
court, by adopting the latter position, has increased the availability and effective-

ness of arbitration as an alternative to litigation. The question remains, however, whether any limits will or should be imposed on the power of arbitrators to
16
award punitive damages.

On December 6, 1982, plaintiff Rodgers Builders, Inc. contracted with defendant McQueen Properties, Ltd. to construct a multi-unit housing project on
land controlled by defendant James McQueen.1 7 The contract contained a
clause that provided that any claims arising out of the contract would be submit-

ted to arbitration.18 Before the project was completed, a dispute arose between
the parties and plaintiff demanded arbitration.19 An arbitration hearing was

scheduled for December 14, 1983, but plaintiff later amended its demand for
arbitration to seek additional damages and to join an additional party. The arbicould not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing
to confirm the award.").
8. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 19:02, at 281.
9. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 33:03, at 469-70.
10. This problem becomes apparent when, for example, the underlying issue is held to be nonarbitrable. If the award only is deemed to violate public policy, the issue still may be arbitrated. But
court review of the award defeats the goal of avoiding litigation through arbitration and undermines
the parties' confidence in arbitration as an effective and final means of dispute resolution. See Note,
JudicialReview of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw.U.L. REv. 545, 546 (1963).
11. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953); Note, supra note 10, at 547.
12. 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29 (1986).
13. Id. at 28-29, 331 S.E.2d at 734.
14. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
17. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 18, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
18. The clause read: " All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the ...
[parties] arising out of, or relating to, the Contract Documents or the breach thereof,... shall be
decided by arbitration ...." Id.
19. Id. at 18-19, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
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trator continued the hearing until January 1984.20 Before the arbitration process had ended, plaintiff instituted a court action against the defendant for
money owed for labor and materials, for fraud, and for unfair and deceptive
trade practices, requesting that trial be delayed until the outcome of arbitration.2 1 In February 1984, an arbitration award granting plaintiff 407,259 dollars
was entered and confirmed. 22 Plaintiff then amended its complaint to allege
fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and negligent misrepresentation, and
to include a claim for one million dollars in punitive damages. 23 At trial, the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
24
plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether the doctrine of
res judicata barred plaintiff's claims. 25 Plaintiff argued that the tort and unfair
trade claims were not arbitrable because they exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement. 26 Thus, plaintiff contended that the doctrine of res judicata
would not apply because its claims "could not or should not have been brought
'27
forward in the arbitration proceeding."
In an opinion by Judge Whichard, 2 s the court of appeals found that plain-

tiff's tort claims were sufficiently related to the contract and its breach to come
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 2 9 The court also held that plain30
tiff's unfair and deceptive trade practices claim was arbitrable.

The court rejected plaintiff's argument that public policy prohibits arbitration of punitive claims, emphasizing the primacy of the state policy favoring
arbitration. 31 Because all of the claims were arbitrable and because they fit
20. Id. at 19, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 19-21, 331 S.E.2d at 728-30.
24. Id. at 22, 331 S.E.2d at 730.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 23, 331 S.E.2d at 731.
27. Id. A confirmed arbitration award has the same res judicata effect as a final judgment
entered by a court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.15 (1983) (an order confirming an award "shall be...
enforced as any other judgment or decree"); M. DONKE, supranote 1, § 39:04, at 510. If a particular
claim is not arbitrable, however, the claim will not be barred in a subsequent court action even
though it arises out of the same cause of action. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 39:04, at 511.
28. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 18, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
29. Id. at 25-26, 331 S.E.2d at 732. A dispute may not be arbitrated unless the parties have
agreed to submit it to arbitration. Charlotte City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Brotherhood. of R.R. Trainmen, 254 N.C. 60, 68, 118 S.E.2d 37, 43 (1961); M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 12:00, at 151. Other
courts have held that arbitration clauses similar to the one discussed in Rodgers, supra note 18, are
broad enough to include tort claims that arise out of the contractual relationship of the parties. E.g.,
Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975).
30. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 27, 331 S.E.2d at 732. Plaintiff contended that the claim it had
filed in court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1985) was not arbitrable because the claim raised
public interest implications. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 26, 331 S.E.2d at 732. The court held that
plaintiff's claim was arbitrable because it was "essentially a private dispute" and was not "asserted to
vindicate any strong public policy which requires it to be litigated rather than arbitrated." Id. at 27,
331 S.E.2d at 733. Other courts also have held that such claims are arbitrable, distinguishing unfair
trade practice claims from antitrust claims which are not arbitrable because they involve strong
public interest factors. See, e.g., Flower World of Am., Inc. v. Wenzel, 122 Ariz. 319, 323, 594 P.2d
1015, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
31. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 28-29, 331 S.E.2d at 734.
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within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the court held that the res judicata

32
effect of the prior arbitration award barred plaintiff's claims.
The Rodgers decision may be explained in terms of North Carolina's strong
state policy favoring arbitration. North Carolina courts have ruled that, by enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, 33 the general assembly evinced a legislative

intent to encourage parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.3 4 Further-

more, the North Carolina Supreme Court has followed the lead of several federal courts that have ruled that doubts concerning the arbitrability of issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.3 5 This pro-arbitration view represents
a nationwide trend: courts and legislatures, recognizing the advantages of arbi37
tration,3 6 have widened the scope of arbitrable issues.

Despite these strong policies in favor of arbitration, courts have held that
certain issues are not arbitrable because other public policies require a judicial
resolution. Most of these cases have involved statutory causes of action. 38 In
the areas of child custody and support, the courts have permitted the use of
arbitration, but awards have been subject to judicial review because a state stat39
ute requires that courts protect the interests of the child.

Although no bright-line test exists to determine whether a particular statute
embodies a policy that prohibits arbitration, 4 ° the courts have offered various
32. Id. at 29-30, 331 S.E.2d at 735.
33. See supra note 4.
34. See Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. Lafave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 229, 321 S.E.2d 872, 876
(1984); Thomas v. Howard, 51 N.C. App. 350, 355-56, 276 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1981).
35. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. Lafave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 229, 321 S.E.2d 872, 876
(1984). The Cyclone Roofing Co. court relied on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982):
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or
a like defense to arbitrability.
Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Supreme Court based
its interpretation of the Act on numerous decisions by the federal circuit courts of appeals. Id. at 25
n.1.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
37. See-M. DOMKE, supra note 1,§ 12:02, at 155.
38. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 19:02, at 281; Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate:
An Examination of the PublicPolicy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. Rv. 481, 482 (1981). The most common example of a nonarbitrable statutory action is an antitrust violation. See, e.g., American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar
Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968). For other examples of
nonarbitrable claims, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to
77bbbb (1982)); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970)
(patent laws), cert denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982)); Homewood Indus. v. Caldwell, 360 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Il1. 1973) (trademark
laws).
39. See, eg., Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966);
Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982); see also, Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Americans Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949) (vacating arbitrator's decision that union could direct nonstriking employees to refuse to handle certain telegrams because the
decision would frustrate public policy embodied in a statute that made such refusal unlawful).
40. Sterk, supra note 38, at 482-83.
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rationales for findings of nonarbitrability. Perhaps the most compelling rationale is that a private resolution of the dispute may adversely affect nonparticipating third parties, whose interests the courts must protect. Such third parties
may include the general public, as in antitrust cases,4 1 or particular individuals,
as in child custody and support cases. 4 2 In addition, the courts may reason that
issues and evidence involved in the dispute are too complex for arbitration, 43
that the dispute should be resolved according to legal principles rather than
business expertise and experience, 44 or that the intention of the legislature in
enacting the statute in question is best effectuated by holding that the cause of
45
action created cannot be waived by an arbitration agreement.
Although the typical modem arbitration statute places few, if any, limits on
the scope of arbitrable issues, 4 6 the courts have fashioned these public policy
exceptions. 47 To hold that an issue is not arbitrable, a court must determine
that the imperativeness of the policy in question overrides the advantages of
arbitration. 48 This balancing approach is especially difficult when the court
must consider a motion to vacate or modify an award, because the statutory
scope of judicial review of awards is often extremely limited. 49 As a result, the
courts are reluctant to recognize public policy exceptions to modern arbitration
41. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated:
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects
the public interest.... Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands-perhaps
millions-of people and inflict staggering economic damage.
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968).
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968) (antitrust litigation).
44. See, eg., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968). A
major motivation for choosing arbitration over litigation is that arbitration permits disputes to be
resolved according to the arbitrator's business expertise rather than rules of law. See supra text
accompanying note 3.
45. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (securities laws). One commentator has suggested that the best rationale for the Wilko decision is that securities sales agreements are not freely
negotiated and arbitration agreements should not be imposed in situations of unequal bargaining
power. See Sterk, supra note 38, at 517-18.
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The North Carolina arbitration statute provides
only two exceptions to its operation: arbitration agreements which stipulate that the Act shall not
apply, and arbitration agreements in labor contracts that do not expressly provide that the Act shall
apply. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(b) (1983). Parties always may limit the scope of arbitrable issues
in their agreement. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 12:00, at 151.
47. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
49. Note, supra note 10, at 548-49; see, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13-.14 (1983). The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statutory grounds for vacatur, modification, and
correction of an award are exclusive. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. Lafave Co., 312 N.C. 224,
234, 321 S.E.2d 872, 879 (1984) (citing Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 41
N.C. App. 407, 411, 255 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1979)). Although a public policy exception might be
justified by the statutory provision for vacatur when arbitrators have "exceeded their powers," see,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13(a)(3) (1983), one commentator has argued that a better approach
would be to construe the arbitration statute so as to accommodate other important state policies.
Note, supra note 10, at 549.
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statutes, 50 and generally they have limited them to situations in which submis-

sion of the dispute to arbitration conflicts with an important legislative policy.5 1
The New York Court of Appeals departed from this traditional judicial
reluctance in Garrityv. Lyle Stuart, Inc.5 2 by holding that public policy prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. The Garrity decision did not
rest on a statutory policy, but rather on the court's finding that the granting of

punitive damages constitutes a form of punishment, which only the state can
53

impose. The court reasoned that the party who selects the arbitrator may influence his or her decision, thereby creating the danger of economic coercion
through the imposition of punitive damages 5 4 awarded without the supervision
and review present in an action at law.55 The dissent argued that the award
'5 6
should have been confirmed because it was "neither irrational nor unjust."
According to the majority, however, such a standard would not prevent abuse of
the arbitrator's power and, contrary to the arbitral goal of avoiding litigation,
57
would permit courts to review awards for their justness.
50. M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 33:03, at 470.
51. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. For examples of the courts' unwillingness to
vacate awards on the basis of nonstatutory policies, see Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas
Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), (arbitrator failed to apply rule of contraproferentum in
construing insurance contract), cert denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d
623, 389 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1979) (arbitrator enforced restrictive covenant by enjoining
covenantor from engaging in like employment); Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160
N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (arbitrator awarded specific performance of an employment
contract).
52. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). Garritywas the first case to hold
unequivocally that punitive damages may not be awarded in arbitration under a modem arbitration
statute. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court previously had vacated an award
of punitive damages. Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div. 500,
114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952). However, that court later refused to vacate an arbitrator's award of a
penalty made pursuant to a liquidated damages clause and noted that the applicable arbitration
statute at the time of the Publishers' Ass'n decision had been repealed and replaced by one that
broadened the scope of arbitrable issues. Associated Gen. Contractors, N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v.
Savin Bros., Inc., 45 A.D.2d 136, 141-42, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374, 380 (1974), afTd, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335
N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975) (per curiam). The court also stated that the Publishers'Ass'n
decision had ignored the critical question whether the policy prohibiting an award of punitive damages outweighs the policy favoring arbitration. Id. at 142, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The Garritymajority distinguished Savin Bros. on the grounds that the contract in that case contained a liquidated
penalty provision, Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, N.Y.S.2d at 833, but the dissent
rejected this distinction. Id. at 363-64, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting). A student commentator also has stated that the two cases are irreconcilable. Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 282-83
(1978).
53. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 358-59, 353 N.E.2d at 796-97, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34. Although the
arbitration in Garrity involved a contract dispute that traditionally may not have warranted punitive
damages, the court expressly held that arbitrators could not award punitive damages even in situations in which they could be awarded by a court. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
833. The court also held that parties may not agree to authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages. Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
54. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34.
55. Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835. The court specifically referred to the
trial court's power to alter awards of punitive damages and to the appellate court's power to modify
awards. Id.
56. Id. at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
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Although two other jurisdictions have followed Garrity,58 federal district

courts consistently have held that punitive damages may be awarded by arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act.5 9 In Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co.
v. Kafilma International,Inc. 60 the court found no public policy that would justify prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, and the court re-

cited several reasons to support its decision. First, the value of arbitration partly
61
depends on the flexibility that arbitrators may exercise in fashioning remedies.
Second, because the arbitrator is an expert in the field, he or she may be better
62
equipped than a judge or jury to determine the proper amount of damages.
Last, if arbitrators do not have the discretion to award punitive damages, a

plaintiff who is entitled to such relief must arbitrate first and then proceed to
trial on the sole issue of damages. Such a process is wasteful and destroys the
major advantage of arbitration, which theoretically is avoiding the expense and
63
delay of litigation.
Certain state courts also have refused to follow the Garrity rule. The California Court of Appeals upheld an arbitration award of punitive damages pursu-

ant to a medical malpractice claim. 64 The court reasoned that to deny
arbitrators the power to award punitive damages for a claim that traditionally

gives rise to such relief would frustrate the legislature's intent to encourage arbitration of medical malpractice claims. 65 The Florida Court of Appeals permit-

ted arbitration of a claim under Florida's "civil theft statute" which authorizes a
treble damage remedy. 66 Although the court conceded that the statute is "remedial in its purpose" and "embodies public policy," it held the claim arbitrable
because the effect of a violation on the public would be incidental and the issue
67
involved was not complex.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Rodgers relied primarily on the
reasoning of the Willoughby decision and held that arbitrators have the power to
award punitive damages. 68 The court did not deny the basic premise in Garrity
58. See School City v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local # 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 662-63
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 102 N.M. 607, 609, 698 P.2d 880, 882 (1985).
59. See Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala.
1984), affid, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821
(M.D.N.C. 1983).
60. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 361-62.
62. Id. at 363-64.
63. Id. at 364.
64. Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
65. Id. at 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684. A California statute specifically provides for the arbitration of medical malpractice claims. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
66. Sabates v. International Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
67. Id.
68. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 733-34. North Carolina courts previously have
adopted federal policies concerning arbitration. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In Rodgers the court of appeals held that it was appropriate to look to federal cases to determine the
arbitrability of issues because North Carolina and federal policies were identical in that respect.
Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 24, 331 S.E.2d at 731. Interestingly, those states that have denied arbitrators the power to award punitive damages also have modem arbitration statutes and avowed policies
favoring arbitration. School City v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local # 511, 422 N.E.2d 656,
661 (Ind. App. 1981) (interpreting IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (Burns 1971)); Shaw v.
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that punitive damages are imposed in civil actions not to redress private wrongs,
but to punish and deter wrongful conduct as a matter of public policy. 69 Indeed,
North Carolina case law clearly recognizes that an award of punitive damages
does involve public policy. 7 0 Nevertheless, the Rodgers court disagreed with the
Garrity majority's conclusion that 7private
parties may not enforce this policy
1
arbitration.
of
process
the
through
The primary concern of the Garrity majority was the potential for abuse if
arbitrators were permitted to award punitive damages. 72 This potential for
abuse exists because (1) selection of the arbitrator by one party may bias his or
her decision, and (2) arbitration does not entail the same procedural safeguards
as a trial. 7 3 However, this argument does not address the specific issue of punitive damages, but rather attacks the arbitration process itself. By submitting a
dispute to arbitration, a party voluntarily gives up certain rights and protections
that exist in an action at law. 74 Parties would not submit any disputes to arbitration if they did not believe that a fair resolution could be obtained. Furthermore, the review of awards must be limited to retain the value of avoiding
75
litigation.
Although the power to impose punitive damages does create some danger
of excessive and unjust awards, arbitration statutes typically provide that the
courts may vacate an award if an arbitrator was partial or corrupt. 76 In addition, several courts have held that an award will be vacated if it is "completely
irrational" 77 or evidences a "manifest disregard" of the law. 78 Although the
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statutory grounds for vacatur
are exclusive, 79 it could adopt such a standard of review if faced with an appropriate case. Because the courts may review all awards to determine whether
they meet this standard, the rationale of the Garritymajority, that applying such
a standard to punitive damage awards would permit undue judicial interference, 80 is unpersuasive. Furthermore, the charge that punitive damage awards
may reflect prejudice rather than impartial judgment applies equally well to jury
Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 102 N.M. 607, 608, 698 P.2d 880, 881-82 (1985) (interpreting N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -2 (1978)); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 364-65, 353 N.E.2d 793,
800, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837-38 (1976) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (interpreting N.Y. Civ. PtAc. LAW
§ 7501 (McKinney 1980)).
69. Garrity,40 N.Y.2d at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
70. See, eg., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976)
supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing public policy exceptions).
71. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 27-29, 331 S.E3.2d at 734-35.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
74. See Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 523, 293 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (1982).
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

76. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (1983).
77. See Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972); Lentine v.
Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1972).
78. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).

79. See supra note 49.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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awards. 8 1 Finally, if the parties do not wish to permit arbitrators to impose
punitive damages, they can expressly prohibit punitive damages in the arbitration clause of their contract.8 2
Moreover, rationales that traditionally have justified other public policy exceptions to arbitration simply do not apply to the arbitrator's discretion to
award punitive damages. 83 Although other exceptions have derived from legislative policies, 84 punitive damage awards involve a common-law policy that does
not directly affect the interests of outside parties. 85 In a typical contract dispute,
the issues and evidence should not be too complex for arbitration, nor should the
parties be required to resolve their disputes according to legal principles. The
courts have not permitted arbitration of antitrust or employment discrimination
claims because private parties may not resolve such disputes on the basis of commercial considerations. 86 In contrast to the relative inexperience of trial courts,
the arbitrators' knowledge and experience regarding particular businesses best
whether certain commercial conduct warrants the imenable them to determine
87
penalty.
a
of
position
In addition, when the courts prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages, they create practical problems that reduce the value and efficiency of
arbitration as an alternative to litigation: disgruntled parties could demand a
separate trial on the issue of damages and, at the same time, arbitrators would
88
lose their discretion to fashion remedies according to their business expertise.
Profound difficulties arise because, unlike other public policy exceptions that
prohibit the arbitration of certain causes of action, the punitive damages exception only prohibits a certain remedy. This prohibition contravenes the express
intent of legislatures that have authorized arbitrators to grant relief that could
not be obtained from a court; 89 legislative policy favors flexibility in arbitration
awards.
Several commentators have noted that punitive damages can serve as a valuable tool for the arbitrator, especially when he or she must arbitrate disputes
90
that arise out of long-term contracts such as collective bargaining agreements.
In such situations, compensatory damages may be inadequate or difficult to determine, and the threat of a punitive remedy may be the only way to ensure
compliance with the agreement. 9 1 This example demonstrates that arbitrators
81. See Comment, "Extra Contractual"Remedies for Breach of Contractin North Carolina,55
N.C.L. REV. 1125, 1132 (1977).

82. See Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 365.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 39-53.

84. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
85. See Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting); Sterk, supra note 36, at 531; Note, supra note 52, at 289-91.
86. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
87. See supra text accompanying note 62.
88. See supratext accompanying notes 61-63. For an extensive criticism of the Garritydecision
in this regard, see Note, supra note 52.
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90. See Note, The Enforceability ofan Arbitrator'sAward of a Penalty,52 COLUM. L. REv. 943,
945 (1952); Note, supra note 52, at 291-95.
91. Note, supra note 52, at 294.
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must be able to create a remedy that meets the demands of a specific situation,
and that the arbitrator's discretion would be severely hampered by the prohibi-

tion of a particular remedy.
Another problem with the punitive damages exception arises because arbi-

trators need not explain how they determine the amount of an award, nor must
they designate particular amounts as compensatory or punitive. 92 Thus, if the
courts alone decided the issue of punitive damages, a reviewing court would

need to examine carefully a challenged award in two respects-not only whether
the award actually was punitive, but also what amount represented punishment
rather than compensation. Although the Garritycourt argued that empowering

arbitrators to award punitive damages would necessitate extensive review of
awards, 93 the denial of this power may require even greater judicial interference
in arbitration. 94 In Garrity the court had no difficulty deciding how much of the
award to vacate because the arbitrator designated part of the award as punitive. 95 An award may not be vacated, however, on the grounds that the arbitra-

tor made a mistake of law or fact. 9 6 Thus, an arbitrator who wished to impose a
punitive sanction might escape judicial review by including a punitive sanction
in the compensatory portion of the award, 97 which would make it a nonreviewable mistake.

Yet another concern exists that, by submitting a dispute to arbitration, a
plaintiff might unwittingly forfeit the right to punitive damages because of the
res judicata effect of arbitration awards. 98 Although the Rodgers decision stated

that claims would not be barred if they were not arbitrable, 99 at least one court
has barred a claim for punitive damages even though the arbitrators were not
permitted to grant them.l0 Moreover, even if the punitive damages claim is not
barred, parties may decide to forego their claims rather than endure a separate
trial on the issue of punitive damages. In either case the policy underlying puni92. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Ball-Thrash Co. v. McCormack, 172 N.C.
677, 679, 90 S.E. 916, 917 (1916); Note, supra note 52, at 295.
93. See supra text accompanying note 57.
94. See Note, supra note 90, at 945; Note, supra note 52, at 295-.99; Note, Arbitration and
Award-Court VacatesAssessment ofPunitive Damages in ContractArbitrationBecause it Would Not
Grant Such Damages in a Suit, 66 HARv. L. REV. 525, 526 (1953).
95. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 355, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
96. See Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 236, 321 S.E.2d 872, 880
(1984) (refusing to modify arbitrator's award on grounds that arbitrator's decisions in calculating
award were "inappropriate").
97. See Note, supra note 52, at 300. One court that followed the Garrity rule so rigidly adhered
to the label rather than the substance of an award that it refused to consider the vacated portion of
an award as attorney's fees, which comprised the true measure of the damages, simply because the
arbitrator labelled it "punitive." School City v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local # 511, 422
N.E.2d 656, 661 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
98. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363; Note, Arbitration: The Award of Punitive Damages as a
PublicPolicy Question, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 546, 550-51 (1976).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
100. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). The court barred the claim because plaintiff had voluntarily submitted the dispute to arbitration. Id. Although a claim that arises under a binding arbitration agreement might not be barred,
the decision undoubtedly will result in the litigation of claims that would have been arbitrated if
punitive damages were available.
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tive damages is defeated because the defendant's wrongful conduct goes
unpunished.
The Rodgers court held that arbitrators can award punitive damages, but
the decision arose from a context in which punitive damages could also be obtained in court. 10 1 Such a context obviates traditional policy reasons that have
justified prohibiting punitive damages awards. 102 The courts should not permit
the arbitration of a claim while preventing the arbitrator from granting appropriate relief. The Garrity rule10 3 would deter any plaintiff with a punitive damages claim from submitting that claim to arbitration, and this result directly
conflicts with legislative policy encouraging parties to arbitrate "any controversy
existing between them."'04
The Rodgers decision did not address the question whether arbitrators
could award punitive damages when such relief would not be available in an
action at law. Punitive damages generally are not available for breach of contract, unless a tort accompanies the breach.10 5 If the arbitrator awards punitive
damages for a simple breach, then the policy arguments for vacating such an
award become stronger. No separate trial would be required if the plaintiff
sought punitive damages but knew an arbitrator could not award them because a
court would not grant punitive damages. Similarly, the inability of arbitrators to
impose punitive damages would not deter the submission of disputes to arbitration. Finally, the Garrity court's concerns regarding the abuse of punitive sanctions by private parties10 6 become much more relevant when punishment is
inflicted in cases in which the common law deems such a remedy inappropriate.
Nevertheless, a rule that authorizes punitive damage awards only in those
cases in which legal grounds for such a remedy exist would create several
problems. The courts would have to scrutinize carefully a challenged award to
ascertain whether sufficient grounds support the award. Because arbitrators are
not bound by substantive law or rules of evidence' 0 7 and because they need not
explain their awards,' 0 8 this determination may require extensive judicial review. In addition, in several situations punitive damages would serve a useful or
even appropriate purpose even when a court could not grant them.109 Finally,
101. In Rodgers plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was based on the allegation that defend-

ant's false representation was "grossly negligent and committed with reckless disregard of plaintiff's

rights and interests ...." Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at 21, 331 S.E.2d at 729. Although punitive
damages generally are unavailable in an action for breach of contract, they may be awarded when
the breach is accompanied by aggravated tortious conduct. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
291 N.C. 105, 111-12, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976). For an extensive discussion of when punitive
damages will be permitted for breach of contract in North Carolina, see Comment, supra note 81.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
103. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (1983); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 101. In Garrity,the arbitrator had awarded punitive damages for breach of
contract. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832. However, the court
explicitly held that an arbitrator could not award punitive damages even when they could be
awarded in an action at law. See supra note 53.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
107. See Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 523, 293 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1982).
108. See supra text accompanying note 92.
109. See supratext accompanying notes 90-91. One commentator has suggested that courts take
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legislatures have recognized the value of permitting arbitrators to fashion remedies without regard to legal principles.' 10

Although some potential for abuse would exist if arbitrators were authorized to award punitive damages, the difficulties that would arise when courts

deny or limit the arbitrator's discretion outweigh this potential. Legislative endorsement of arbitration indicates a general confidence in the process as an alternative to litigation. Knowledgeable and experienced arbitrators would not

impose penalties without justification. 1 I Because arbitrators resolve disputes

with regard to business considerations rather than legal expertise, they should be
permitted to punish and deter conduct they deem reprehensible, even if a court
would not or could not make a similar award. If glaring abuses occur and the

award is manifestly unjust, then the court may vacate the award. 117
The Rodgers decision represents a reaffirmation of North Carolina's strong
policy in favor of arbitration. The court rejected a rule that would have reduced
the scope of arbitrable issues and severely hampered the arbitrator's ability to
grant appropriate relief. Given the difficulties inherent in any attempt to impose
broad limitations on arbitral remedies, the courts should proceed on a case-by-

case basis, separately identifying those specific instances in which the use of arbi11 3
tration contravenes important state policies.

MITCHELL

J.

BENOWITZ

an intermediate position by permitting arbitrators to award punitive damages in certain 'situations
that traditionally have not given rise to their availability. See Note, supra note 52, at 306-08. The
commentator offers an analytical framework to determine if a punitive award should stand: (1) Did
the parties expressly or impliedly agree to empower the arbitrators to impose punitive damages?;
(2) Can the apparently punitive award actually be categorized as compensatory?; and (3) Is the
award "reasonably necessary to protect societally useful exchange?" Id. Such an approach would
retain arbitrators' flexibility in fashioning relief while ensuring that punitive sanctions are imposed in
accordance with state policy. But this approach requires extensive judicial review and involves a
complex analysis that may be difficult to apply. The commentator admits that "this intensive review
will require judicial effort." Id. at 306.
110. See supra note 7. Although such statutes would seem to prohibit the courts from vacating
an award on the grounds that the remedy would not be available in a judicial proceeding, vacatur
could be justified on public policy grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
111. Those courts that have vacated punitive awards rely exclusively on policy grounds, and
they have rejected contentions that the awards should stand because they were not unreasonable.
See School City v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local # 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 661 n.10 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981); Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835. One other court
that adopted the Garrityrule actually had decided the case before it on other grounds, but the court
held that claims for punitive damages are not arbitrable. See Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 102
N.M. 607, 608-09, 698 P.2d 880, 882 (1985).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
113. Note, supra note 10, at 548.

